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Abstract
Weighted Updating generalizes Bayesian updating, allowing for biased be-
liefs by weighting the likelihood function and prior distribution with positive
real exponents. I provide a rigorous foundation for the model by showing that
transforming a distribution by exponential weighting (and normalizing) sys-
tematically affects the information entropy of the resulting distribution. For
weights greater than one the resulting distribution has less information entropy
than the original distribution, and vice versa. The entropy of a distribution
measures how informative a decision maker is treating the underlying obser-
vation(s), so this result suggests a useful interpretation of the weights. For
example, a weight greater than one on a likelihood function models an indi-
vidual who is treating the associated observation(s) as being more informative
than a perfect Bayesian would.
JEL Codes: C02, D03, D83
Keywords: Bayesian Updating, Cognitive Biases, Irrational Expectations,
Learning, Uncertainty
1 Introduction
The weighted updating model generalizes Bayes’ rule to allow for biased learning.
Despite the fact that this model has seen some use in economics and other disciplines,
there has not yet been a rigorous interpretation of the model or justification for
using it. Those who use the model have, heretofore, justified its use by appealing
to intuition. This paper eliminates this shortcoming with a result that provides a
∗I appreciate Ted Bergstrom, Gary Charness, Itzhak Gilboa, Zack Grossman, Botond Ko˝szegi,
Jason Lepore, Dick Startz and seminar participants at Cal Poly San Luis Obispo, the 2014 Bay Area
Behavioral and Experimental Economics Workshop, and the 2013 meetings of the Society for the
Advancement of Behavioral Economics for valuable comments and suggestions.
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rationale for using the model as it has been used. Namely, I show that transforming
a distribution by exponentially weighting it and normalizing systematically affects
the information entropy of the resulting distribution relative to that of the original
distribution.
Whether the information entropy of the resulting distribution is greater or less
than the original distribution depends on the magnitude of the exponential weight.
If the weight is greater than one then the information entropy of the resulting distri-
bution is less than that of the original distribution, and vice versa. Each of the distri-
butions constituting Bayes’ rule represents how either empirical observations or prior
information affects beliefs. As such, the information entropies of these distributions
measure how informative the individual regards these pieces of information. There-
fore, this result provides the interpretation that weighting is a parametric method
with which to model the treatment of data as either more or less informative than
with Bayesian updating. One can thus say that weighted updating embodies a the-
ory of biased judgement, wherein these biases are a result of the treatment of data as
containing inaccurate levels of information content.
Literature that uses the weighting updated model in one form or another in-
cludes Grether (1980, 1992), who estimates the exponential weights on the likeli-
hood function and the prior distribution to find empirical evidence for the repre-
sentativeness heuristic. Ibrahim and Chen (2000) introduced power priors, which
allows the researcher to consider data from previous studies by putting a weight in
(0, 1) on the likelihood function for that data and putting a weight of 1 for cur-
rent data. Van Benthem et al. (2009) define a weighted product updating rule and
go on to prove that Bayes’ rule and the Jeffrey updating rule are both special cases.
Palfrey and Wang (2012) use weighted updating to model investor under- and overre-
action to public information about financial assets in a model with speculative pricing.
Benjamin et al. (2015) use the weighted updating model to study non-belief in the
law of large numbers.
2 The Weighted Updating Model
A decision maker will consider an observation (or sequence of observations) x as an
outcome from a stochastic process with probability density function f(x|θ), where
θ is an unknown parameter that the decision maker considers to be from parameter
space Θ. Bayesian beliefs regarding the value of θ after observing x are completely
described by the posterior distribution pi(θ|x). If we let (Θ,A, m) be a measure space
and denote the likelihood function with f(x|θ) and the prior distribution with pi(θ),
then Bayes’ rule states that
pi(θ|x) =
f(x|θ)pi(θ)∫
Θ
f(x|θ)pi(θ) dm(θ)
.
Weighted updating augments Bayes’ rule with real-valued parameters α and β
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as exponents respectively on the likelihood function and prior probability distribu-
tion. Denote the posterior distribution under weighted updating after observing x by
p˜i(θ|x). Then the weighted updating model is given by
p˜i(θ|x) =
f(x|θ)βpi(θ)α∫
Θ
f(x|θ)βpi(θ)α dm(θ)
. (1)
Both Bayes’ rule and the weighted updating model can be stated without mention
of the marginal distribution, which is not a function of θ and serves only as a normal-
ization, ensuring that the posterior distribution aggregates to one over its support.1
Thus, the weighted updating model can be displayed as
p˜i(θ|x) ∝ f(x|θ)βpi(θ)α. (1′)
Stating the model as in expression (1′) emphasizes how the nature of the posterior
distribution depends solely on the interaction between the prior distribution and the
likelihood distribution, and how the weights α and β affect this interaction.
Zinn (2015) expands upon the basic model in expression (1) in two ways: The first
involves individuals who may discriminate between observations. Given a sequence of
observations ht = (x1, . . . , xt), the version of (1
′) that allows for such discrimination
would be
p˜i(θ|ht) ∝ pi(θ)
α
t∏
j=1
f(xj |hj−1, θ)
βj ,
where α still weights the prior distribution, βj is the weight associated with the jth
observation xj , and hj = (x1, . . . , xj), for each j ∈ {1, . . . , t}. The second expansion
of the basic weighted updating model allows the weights to change over time, which
is simply a matter of letting the weights be functions of time, as in
p˜i(θ|ht) ∝ f(ht|θ)
β(t)pi(θ)α(t).
In addition to those biases that (1) is capable of modelling, these expansions allow
weighted updating to model the availability heuristic, base-rate neglect, the law of
small numbers, non-belief in the law of large numbers, order effects (e.g. recency and
primacy), the representativeness heuristic, and self-attribution bias.
1Throughout the paper, I assume all functions are measurable and integrable so that integrals are
finite and well-defined. This assumption includes the functions generated by exponential weighting.
In many cases, this assumption is innocuous because weighting a distribution with an exponent and
rescaling results in a distribution from the original family, so integrability follows. However, this does
not always hold true. For example, the function (1 − p)x−p represents a distribution over x ≥ 1 if
and only if p > 1. Taking such a distribution to a power α < 1/p and doing the usual normalization
does not result in another distribution, as the integral over [1,∞) of the resulting function diverges.
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3 Monotone Concentration and Dispersion
In this section, I investigate how exponentially weighting a distribution affects the re-
sulting distribution relative to the original. Note that I change the notation from what
is used in the previous section in an effort to make it clear that the following results
apply to the likelihood function(s) and the prior distribution individually. Likewise,
results involving the weight γ can be interpreted as true all of the exponential weights
mentioned in the previous section.
Let (Ω,S,M) be a measure space and consider the transformation
g 7−→
g(ω)γ∫
Ω
g(ω)γ dM(ω)
. (2)
If γ > 0 then (2) is a strictly increasing transformation, which implies that the same
is true for its inverse. As such, the value(s) that maximize (or minimize) g and
the distribution proportional to gγ are identical. In other words, transformation (2)
is necessarily mode-preserving. Note, however, that such a transformation is not
necessarily mean-preserving, as is likely to be the case when g is an asymmetric
distribution.
Most relevant for this work is that the exponent γ affects how concentrated or
dispersed the resulting distribution is. The following definition precisely describes
what I mean by “concentrated” and ”dispersed”.2
Definition 1 (Monotone Dispersion, Monotone Concentration). For two non-uniform
probability distributions Γ and g on the same support Ω, Γ is a monotone dispersion
of g if for all pairs (ω1, ω2) ∈ Ω
2 the following three conditions hold:
g(ω1) = g(ω2) ⇔ Γ(ω1) = Γ(ω2), (3)
g(ω1) > g(ω2) ⇔ Γ(ω1) > Γ(ω2), and (4)
g(ω1) > g(ω2) ⇒
g(ω1)
g(ω2)
>
Γ(ω1)
Γ(ω2)
. (5)
If Γ is a monotone dispersion of g then g is a monotone concentration of Γ.3
See Figure 1 for an example of two distributions that are related to each other
through monotone dispersion and concentration. Note that conditions (3) and (4)
2Note that “monotone dispersion” is distinct from “monotone spread”, a related concept due
to Quiggin (1988). A monotone dispersion differs from a monotone spread in that the latter is
necessarily mean-preserving.
3Uniform distributions are excluded from Definition 1 because if either g or Γ were uniform then
the other would necessarily be uniform by condition (3), so they would be the same distribution.
If this is the case then conditions (4) and (5) are only vacuously true, which is not useful for
our purposes because condition (5) provides an asymmetry that allows one to compare different
distributions. Excluding uniform distributions ensures that there is no case in which the relations
“is a monotone dispersion of” and “is a monotone concentration of” are symmetric.
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Figure 1: Γ is a monotone dispersion of g, g is a monotone concentration of Γ.
g
Γ
ω
g(ω),Γ(ω)
require that the transformations g 7→ Γ and Γ 7→ g are strictly increasing functions.
Such monotonicity ensures that the ordinal properties are identical within pairs of
distributions that are dispersions and concentrations of each other. In other words,
two agents with beliefs that are related by monotone dispersion or concentration will
agree on a rank ordering of events according to their likelihoods as given by their
respective beliefs. Expression (5) describes how the cardinal properties of a mono-
tone dispersion or concentration differ from the original function, with a monotone
dispersion being closer to a uniform distribution. Thus, a monotone concentration,
with “higher highs” and “lower lows”, is an exaggeration of any of its monotone
dispersions. The following theorem states these notions rigorously.4
Theorem 1. Let Γ be a monotone dispersion of g. For any ω1, ω2 ∈ Ω,
g(ω1) > g(ω2) ≥ Γ(ω2) ⇒ g(ω1) > Γ(ω1).
Also,
g(ω1) < g(ω2) ≤ Γ(ω2) ⇒ g(ω1) < Γ(ω1).
The next theorem guarantees that if a distribution has a maximum then that
maximum is no less than that of any associated monotone dispersion.
Theorem 2. Let Γ be a monotone dispersion of g and let ω∗ be a maximizer of g.
Then g(ω∗) ≥ Γ(ω∗). If it is also the case that
M({ω : g(ω) < g(ω∗)}) > 0,
then g(ω∗) > Γ(ω∗).
4Proofs for all results are in the appendix.
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Interest in monotone dispersions and concentrations is due to the fact that when
a distribution is weighted with a positive power and normalized, the resulting distri-
bution is either a monotone dispersion or concentration of the original distribution
depending on whether the weight is less than or greater than one, as stated in Theo-
rem 3 below.
Theorem 3. Let g : Ω → R++ be any non-uniform probability distribution. If
γ ∈ (0, 1) then
g(ω)γ∫
Ω
g(ω)γ dM(ω)
, (6)
is a monotone dispersion of g. If it is the case that γ > 1 then (6) is a monotone
concentration of g.
As long as both distributions are well-defined, Theorem 3 guarantees that a posi-
tively weighted distribution results in either a monotone dispersion or concentration
of the original.
4 How Should Dispersion be Measured?
In this section, I study how the notions of dispersion and concentration from Definition
1 can be measured. I consider variance and show why it is not, in general, up to
the task. In contrast, a distribution’s information entropy is. I provide this result in
Theorem 4, below, before discussing its implications for the weighted updating model.
4.1 Variance?
As variance is a widely used measure of how disperse a distribution is, one may suspect
that a monotone dispersion would always have more variance than an associated
monotone concentration. For many families of distributions this is indeed the case.
Consider the normal distribution with mean µ and variance σ2. It is straightforward
to find that taking this distribution to the power γ > 0 results in a function that is
proportional to the normal distribution with mean µ and variance σ2/γ. After doing
this manipulation, one can utilize Theorem 3 to note that γ < 1 leads to a monotone
dispersion of the original distribution with greater variance and that a monotone
concentration with less variance is the outcome if γ > 1.
Despite being true for the normal distribution (and many others), it is not the
case for all distributions that a monotone dispersion implies greater variance and that
a monotone concentration has less variance. Consider the beta distribution B(a, b),
which is proportional to ya−1(1−y)b−1 for y ∈ [0, 1] and parameters a, b > 0. Cases in
which a, b ∈ (0, 1) result in a u-shaped, strictly convex distribution with peaks at the
extremes of the support, where y = 0, 1. Applying a monotone dispersion results in a
more uniform distribution with less variance and applying a monotone concentration
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shifts mass toward the end-points of [0, 1], resulting in greater variance. For a more
concrete example suppose a = b = 3/4. In this case, B(3/4, 3/4) has a variance of 1/10.
Raising this distribution to the power γ = 2 and normalizing yields B(1/2, 1/2), the
variance of which is 1/8. By Theorem 3, B(1/2, 1/2) is a monotone concentration of
B(3/4, 3/4), yet the former has a greater variance. This provide a counter-example
against the general statement that a monotone concentration has less variance.
Variance does not have a consistent relationship with monotone dispersions and
concentrations because it is a measure of dispersion from the mean of the distribution.
For a consistent relation with monotone dispersion and concentration it is necessary
to have a measure of dispersion that is independent of reference points. Information
entropy is a measure of dispersion that does not depend on reference points, so we
consider it in the next subsection.
4.2 Information Entropy?
As will be shown subsequently in Theorem 4, a distribution’s information entropy
is a measure of dispersion or uncertainty that is invariably greater for monotone
dispersions and less for monotone concentrations. Before getting to that result, I will
introduce and briefly discuss the concept of information entropy.
Definition 2 (Information Entropy, (Shannon, 1948)). For any distribution g : Ω→
R++, the information entropy of g is given by
H(g) ≡ −
∫
Ω
g(ω) log g(ω) dM(ω).
The logarithm ensures that information entropy is additive in the densities of
independent random variables. This is because for any two independent random
variables Y and Z respectively distributed gY and gZ and particular pair of events
(y, z),
− log gY (y)gZ(z) = − log gY (y)− log gZ(z).
Tribus (1961) dubbed − log g(ω) the surprisal of ω, for any distribution g and
particular ω ∈ Ω. Because − log g(ω) is decreasing in g(ω), surprisal is greater for
ω which (according to g) are less likely and, therefore, more surprising outcomes.
The information entropy of a distribution is equivalent to the expected surprisal,
as information entropy is the expected value of the surprisal of a distribution. If
outcomes from one distribution are, on average, more surprising than outcomes from
another distribution, then the first distribution can be thought of as containing less
information than the second. Thus, distributions with greater information entropy
will, on average, generate observations that have less information content, and vice
versa.5
The following theorem verifies the claim that the information entropy of a mono-
tone dispersion is greater than the information entropy of a monotone concentration.
5The interpretation of information entropy as a measure of the uninformativeness of a distribution
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Theorem 4. If Γ is a monotone dispersion of g then H(Γ) ≥ H(g). If, in addition,
M({ω : Γ(ω) 6= r}) > 0
for some r ∈ [b, B], where
b ≡ sup Γ({ω : g(ω) ≤ Γ(ω)}) ∈ R
and
B ≡ inf Γ({ω : g(ω) ≥ Γ(ω)}) ∈ R,
then H(Γ) > H(g).
Corollary 1. If g and g(ω)
γ
∫
Ω
g(ω)γ dM(ω)
are distributions for some γ > 0 then
H(g) > H
(
g(ω)γ∫
Ω
g(ω)γ dM(ω)
)
⇔ γ > 1, and
H(g) < H
(
g(ω)γ∫
Ω
g(ω)γ dM(ω)
)
⇔ γ < 1.
The preceding corollary applies Theorem 4 under the special case where the mono-
tone dispersion or concentration is a result of exponential weighting. It is essentially
a syllogism with Theorems 3 and 4 as premises.
Corollary 1 provides a rationale and rigorous interpretation of the weighted up-
dating model. Consider expression (1). Corollary 1 implies that if α > 1 then the
prior information is being overemphasized and treated with more information content
than it should, and the opposite holds if α < 1. The same interpretation holds for β
with respect to the how informative x is treated. So if, say, α > 1 and β < 1 then the
beliefs represented by that model are made in a manner wherein the prior information
is treated with more information content than it should be and x is treated as though
it has too little information content.
5 Concluding Remarks
In this paper, I provide an interpretation of weighted updating as a method of mod-
elling individuals who treat information as either more or less informative than under
Bayes’ rule. In particular, I show that weighting the functions primitive to Bayes’
rule transforms the functions by monotone dispersion or monotone concentration,
and that these transformations systematically affect the information entropies of the
resulting likelihood function(s) and prior probability distribution.
is consistent with the idea that physical entropy, which is proportional to information entropy by
Boltzmann’s constant, is a measure of one’s ignorance of a system. See, for example, the discussion
in Sethna (2006, §5.3) for this interpretation of physical entropy along with a discussion of its
relationship with information entropy.
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This interpretation of weighting a distribution suggests that, on its own, weighted
updating may be appropriate to model only those biases in which individuals cor-
rectly interpret information, but for some reason do not use the information in a
rational way. Thus, for example, weighted updating may be utilized to model biases
based on self-deception6 or the cognitive limitations of utilizing correctly interpreted
data. However, it may not be appropriate for modelling the type of confirmation bias
studied by Rabin and Schrag (1999), which involves decision makers who misinter-
pret information. Still, there is no reason why there should be only one type of bias
affecting belief formation; one could, for example, model individuals who misinter-
pret evidence using the framework of Rabin and Schrag (1999) and then process the
misinterpreted information irrationally using weighted updating.
Appendix: Proofs
Proof of Theorem 1. Let g(ω1) > g(ω2) ≥ Γ(ω2). As Γ is a monotone dispersion of g,
g(ω1) > g(ω2) implies
g(ω1)
g(ω2)
>
Γ(ω1)
Γ(ω2)
,
which can be rearranged to obtain
Γ(ω2)
g(ω2)
>
Γ(ω1)
g(ω1)
.
Now utilize g(ω2) ≥ Γ(ω2) to augment the above inequality to obtain
1 ≥
Γ(ω2)
g(ω2)
>
Γ(ω1)
g(ω1)
.
And so, g(ω1) > Γ(ω1). The other case implying the opposite conclusion is symmetric.
Q.E.D.
Proof of Theorem 2. Let ω∗ ∈ argmaxω∈Ω g(ω). The hypothesis that Γ is a monotone
dispersion of g implies that both Γ and g are non-uniform, so
{ω : g(ω) < g(ω∗)} 6= ∅.
For any ω0 ∈ {ω : g(ω) < g(ω∗)}, condition (5) from Definition 1 indicates that
g(ω0)
g(ω∗)
<
Γ(ω0)
Γ(ω∗)
. (7)
6Self-deception typically involves individuals who downplay or overemphasize the importance of
certain pieces of evidence in a systematic way (Hirshleifer, 2001).
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For any ω∗∗ ∈ argmaxω∈Ω g(ω) it is the case that g(ω
∗∗) = g(ω∗). Therefore, condition
(3) tells us
g(ω∗∗)
g(ω∗)
=
Γ(ω∗∗)
Γ(ω∗)
. (8)
Since
{ω : g(ω) < g(ω∗)} ∪ argmax
ω∈Ω
g(ω) = Ω,
expressions (7) and (8) imply
g(ω)
g(ω∗)
≤
Γ(ω)
Γ(ω∗)
for all ω ∈ Ω.
Integrating over Ω yields ∫
Ω
g(ω) dM(ω)
g(ω∗)
≤
∫
Ω
Γ(ω) dM(ω)
Γ(ω∗)
. (9)
As both g and Γ are probability distributions, the value of the integrals in the nu-
merators of expression (9) is one. Thus,
1
g(ω∗)
≤
1
Γ(ω∗)
,
which is true only if g(ω∗) ≥ Γ(ω∗). If it is also the case that
M({ω : g(ω) < g(ω∗)}) > 0,
then the inequality in expression (9) is strict, from which g(ω∗) > Γ(ω∗) follows.
Q.E.D.
Proof of Theorem 3. Let γ ∈ (0, 1). Conditions (3) and (4) are satisfied immediately,
as a consequence of the fact that raising to a positive exponent is a monotonically
increasing transformation. As g is non-uniform there exists a pair (ω1, ω2) ∈ Ω
2 for
which g(ω1) > g(ω2) > 0. For any such pair, multiplying each term of 0 < γ < 1 by
log(g(ω1)/g(ω2)) yields
0 < γ log
g(ω1)
g(ω2)
< log
g(ω1)
g(ω2)
,
which implies that
1 <
g(ω1)
γ
g(ω2)γ
<
g(ω1)
g(ω2)
.
Dividing both the numerator and denominator of the center term by the normalizing
factor
∫
Ω
g(ω)γ dM(ω) > 0 yields,
1 <
g(ω1)
γ/
∫
Ω
g(ω)γ dM(ω)
g(ω2)γ/
∫
Ω
g(ω)γ dM(ω)
<
g(ω1)
g(ω2)
,
showing that condition (5) is satisfied. The case for γ > 1 yielding a monotone
concentration is proved analogously. Q.E.D.
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The proof of Theorem 4 utilizes the following lemmas.
Lemma 1. If g and Γ are distributions with the same support Ω then both of the
sets
{ω : g(ω) ≤ Γ(ω)} and {ω : g(ω) ≥ Γ(ω)}
are nonempty.7
Proof. Suppose {ω : g(ω) ≤ Γ(ω)} = ∅. Then g(ω) > Γ(ω) for all ω ∈ Ω. This
implies ∫
Ω
g(ω) dM(ω) >
∫
Ω
Γ(ω) dM(ω),
which, in turn, implies that 1 > 1. This contradiction means
{ω : g(ω) ≤ Γ(ω)} 6= ∅.
Showing that {ω : g(ω) ≥ Γ(ω)} 6= ∅ follows by simply transposing g and Γ. Q.E.D.
Recall from Theorem 4 the following definitions which are used in the next several
results:
b ≡ sup Γ({ω : g(ω) ≤ Γ(ω)}) ∈ R.
B ≡ inf Γ({ω : g(ω) ≥ Γ(ω)}) ∈ R.
Lemma 2. If g is a monotone concentration of Γ then b, B ∈ R.
Proof. Due to Lemma 1, there exist ω1 ∈ {ω : g(ω) ≤ Γ(ω)} and ω2 ∈ {ω : g(ω) ≥
Γ(ω)}. Suppose Γ({ω : g(ω) ≤ Γ(ω)}) is not bounded above. Then, we can choose
ω1 such that Γ(ω1) > g(ω2). To summarize, we have
Γ(ω1) > g(ω2) ≥ Γ(ω2) > 0
and
Γ(ω1) ≥ g(ω1).
As g is a monotone concentration of Γ, condition (4) stipulates that
Γ(ω1) > Γ(ω2) ⇔ g(ω1) > g(ω2).
Therefore,
Γ(ω1) ≥ g(ω1) > g(ω2) ≥ Γ(ω2) > 0.
This implies
Γ(ω1)
Γ(ω2)
>
g(ω1)
g(ω2)
and g(ω1) > g(ω2),
contradicting condition (5), which holds since g is a monotone concentration of Γ.
Therefore, Γ(ω1) ≤ g(ω2) and, since ω1 was chosen arbitrarily, this holds for all
ω1 ∈ {ω : g(ω) ≤ Γ(ω)}. Hence, g(ω2) is an upper bound of Γ({ω : g(ω) ≤ Γ(ω)} ⊂ R.
The completeness of R, thereby, implies that b ∈ R. That B ∈ R can be shown
similarly, though it can be a bit simpler because Γ({ω : g(ω) ≥ Γ(ω)}) > 0. Q.E.D.
7I doubt that this result is original to this work. I include it, however, for sake of completeness.
11
Lemma 3. If g is a monotone concentration of Γ then b ≤ B.
Proof. Suppose that B < b. Then, use the definition of the supremum of a set to
establish that there exists ω1 ∈ Ω for which
g(ω1) < Γ(ω1) and
b+B
2
< Γ(ω1) ≤ b. (10)
Similarly, the definition of the infimum of a set guarantees that there exists ω2 ∈ Ω
such that
Γ(ω2) < g(ω2) and B ≤ Γ(ω2) <
b+B
2
. (11)
Expressions (10) and (11) imply that Γ(ω2) < Γ(ω1), which is true if and only if
g(ω2) < g(ω1) since g be a monotone concentration of Γ. Therefore,
Γ(ω1) ≥ g(ω1) > g(ω2) ≥ Γ(ω2) > 0,
which, as shown in the proof to Lemma 2, is inconsistent with condition (5). Therefore
b ≤ B. Q.E.D.
Lemma 4. If g is a monotone concentration of Γ then there exists r ∈ R such that
Γ(ω) > r ⇒ g(ω) > Γ(ω) (12)
and
Γ(ω) < r ⇒ g(ω) < Γ(ω). (13)
Proof. I prove (12), as the proof of (13) is essentially identical. Lemma 3 guarantees
that [b, B] 6= ∅, so we may consider any r ∈ [b, B]. Choose ω0 ∈ Ω such that Γ(ω0) > r.
Then
b ≤ r < Γ(ω0).
Γ(ω0) > b implies that ω0 /∈ {ω : g(ω) ≤ Γ(ω)}, so g(ω0) > Γ(ω0). Q.E.D.
Proof of Theorem 4. Since the log function is concave, Jensen’s inequality implies∫
Ω
g(ω) log
Γ(ω)
g(ω)
dM(ω) ≤ log
∫
Ω
g(ω)
Γ(ω)
g(ω)
dM(ω). (14)
The right-hand side of expression (14) equals zero since, using the fact that Γ is a
distribution and integrates to unity, log
∫
Ω
Γ(ω) dM(ω) = log 1. Therefore, expression
(14) implies Gibbs’ inequality:8∫
Ω
g(ω) log Γ(ω) dM(ω) ≤
∫
Ω
g(ω) log g(ω) dM(ω),
8Gibbs’ inequality is a well known fact from statistical physics. Previous versions of this proof
initiated with Gibbs’ inequality rather than Jensen’s inequality. I decided to change this because the
education of economists typically involves exposure to Jensen’s inequality and not Gibbs’ inequality.
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which can also be expressed∫
Ω
g(ω) log Γ(ω) dM(ω) ≤ −H(g). (15)
Add H(Γ) to both sides of expression (15) to find that
H(Γ) +
∫
Ω
g(ω) log Γ(ω) dM(ω) ≤ H(Γ)−H(g),
implying that ∫
Ω
[g(ω)− Γ(ω)] log Γ(ω) dM(ω) ≤ H(Γ)−H(g), (16)
Lemma 3 asserts that [b, B] is non-empty, so we can choose any r ∈ [b, B] and write:
− log r
∫
Ω
g(ω)− Γ(ω) dM(ω) = 0, (17)
which is true because g and Γ are both distributions. Adding expressions (16) and
(17) and some rearranging yields∫
Ω
[g(ω)− Γ(ω)](log Γ(ω)− log r) dM(ω) ≤ H(Γ)−H(g). (18)
By Lemma 4, r ∈ [b, B] implies that log Γ(ω)− log r and g(ω)− Γ(ω) have the same
sign, so the left-hand side of expression (18) is non-negative. Therefore, H(g) ≤ H(Γ).
If, additionally, M({ω ∈ Ω : Γ(ω) 6= r}) > 0 then the integral constituting the left-
hand side of expression (18) can be decomposed into∫
{ω:Γ(ω)6=r}
[g(ω)− Γ(ω)](log Γ(ω)− log r) dM(ω)
plus ∫
{ω:Γ(ω)=r}
[g(ω)− Γ(ω)](log Γ(ω)− log r) dM(ω).
The former, by Lemma 4, is strictly positive and the latter equals zero, so H(g) <
H(Γ). Q.E.D.
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